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ABSTRACT
Patent laws can do their bit to help reduce our greenhouse gas emissions. In 2009, accelerated
grant procedures and reduction of fees have been put in place by among others the UK and US
patent offices. Private initiatives such as the eco-patent commons to licence technology free of
charge have been taken. But greening patent law is only a small part of the solution. However
well-intentioned all these initiatives are, for several reasons, they may not be sufficient or even
at all used. More than intellectual property-related solutions, what will be needed is nonintellectual property-related solutions such as using technology already in the public domain,
collaborating rather than competing, funding especially for developing and least developed
countries (to build renewable energy plants, reforest the earth), goodwill (accept to licence
developed countries' technology at cheap prices to developing and least developed countries for
a while) and above all both individual and collective commitment.
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INTRODUCTION

Much hope accompanied the days before and during the Copenhagen summit on
climate change last December.1 The summit did not deliver a treaty, as it was not
anticipated already some time before the summit, but unfortunately it did not even
deliver a strong commitment between the countries present. 2 More will need to be
done in 2010. More specifically, intellectual property rights ("IPR") have been left
3
out of the so-called "Copenhagen Accord" reached on December 18, 2009. Most
developed countries must have given a "pheew" of relief whilst least developed and
developing countries must now feel disgruntled. Whilst many thought earlier in the
year that intellectual property and technology transfer were going to be a focal point
in the Copenhagen negotiations, 4 this prospect vanished when most developed
countries including the European Union ("EU") and the United States ("U.S.")
announced that IPR issues should not be on the agenda in the climate change
negotiations. 5 For them, such issues are better discussed within the international
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1 See, e.g., Editorial, FourteenDays to Sea] tistory's Judgment on This Generation,GUARDIAN
(London), Dec. 7, 2009, at I [hereinafter Fourteen Days] (describing how fifty-six newspapers in
forty-five countries took the unprecedented step of uniting together in drafting one editorial
imploring the attendees of the Copenhagen Summit to take a step forward in addressing the issue of
global climate change).
2 See John M. Broder & Elisabeth Rosenthal, UN Official Says Climate Deal Is at Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A8 (warning that one of the major provisions found within the Copenhagen
accord is in jeopardy because many of the major countries have not submitted their plans for
reducing emissions of climate altering gases); James Kanter, E. U Blames Others for 'GreatFailure'

on Climate, China Rejects UK.Charge That It Raised Barriers to Better Copenhagen Deal, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Dec. 23, 2009, at 1 (reporting that the Copenhagen summit meeting was viewed as a
"great failure" because nations rejected targets and timetables to agree to binding emissions
reductions).
3 Copenhagen Accord, Dec. 18, 2009, CP.15, available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop-15/
application/p df/cop 15_cph-auv.pdf.
4See, e.g., Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Technology Transfer Will Be Partof Copenhagen Climate
Deal, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/09/16/technologytransfer-will-be-part-ofcopenhagen-climate-deal/.

5 Catherine Saez, IP Rights in a Quiet Tug-Of-War at UN Climate Change Negotiations,
INTELL. PROP.WATCH,Nov. 6, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/11/06/ip-rights-in-a-quiettug-of-war-at-un-climate-change-negotiations ("European countries, along with the United States
and most other developed countries consider that IP rights issues do not have a place in the climate
change negotiations ....").Unless otherwise stated, footnotes in quotations have been omitted.
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institutions which "already have a mandate and an expertise on the subject, such as
the [World Trade Organisation]."6
In fact, it may not be all that important for any country, be it developed or
developing, that IPR are kept in or left out of climate talks in the end. 7 The reason is
simple. Whilst IPR can definitely play a role in mitigating climate change, a myriad
of other measures can do so too, and perhaps even more than IPR. This is reflected
in the Copenhagen Accord and constitutes its positive aspect.8 According to its
article 3, "developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable
financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support the implementation
of adaptation action in developing countries." 9 Whilst IPR are absent from the
wording of the text, "technology" or "technology transfer" appears in almost half of
the articles (namely art. 3, 5, 8, 10 and 11).1 Article 11 also states that technology
transfer will be accelerated in support of action on adaptation and mitigation but
adds that this "will be guided by a country-driven approach and be based on national
circumstances and priorities."11 Thus, even if there is no talk of free intellectual
property, compulsory licences, suspension or denial of patents on green technologies,
technology transfer will somehow occur even if indirectly and/or partially.
Arrangements will be made on an ad-hoc basis and it is not excluded that some
patented technologies will be licensed at low prices or be gratis in some situations
anyway. In any case, much green technology already is in the public domain. Also it
is not only technology which is needed, funding to take measures to adapt to climate
12
change and to reforest the planet are also a big part of the solution to the problem.
Even if there must be a mix of different initiatives to tackle global warming and
IPR are only part of the solution, still, IPR, mainly patents, can and should be used
to reduce green house gases ("GHG") emissions. In the first part of this editorial,
both IP and non-IP-related solutions will be discussed and their respective merits
examined. Before concluding, the second part will discuss the contribution of the
U.S.

6 Id.; see also Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, IP References Left Out Of Last-Minute, Weak Global
Climate Deal In Copenhagen, Dec. 19, 2009, http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2009/12/19/ip
references-left-out-of-last-minute-weak-global-climate-dealin-copenhagen ("[T]he United States and
the European Union in particular held that IP should not be part of this particular draft text or any
climate agreement in general.").
7 See

Peter Drahos, The China-USRelationship on Climate Change, IntellectualPropertyand

CCS. Requiem fora Species?, 1 WIPO J. 125, 132 (2009) ("Probably the best strategy here is to keep
intellectual property rights out of climate change negotiations and deal with specific issues as they
arise on a case by case basis."). Contra Matthew Rimmer, The Road to Copenhagen: Intellectual
Property and Climate Change, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 784, 787 (2009) ("[It would be a matter
of great concern if the proposed agreement did not properly address matters of IP and climate
change.").
8 Copenhagen Accord, supra note 3.

9Id. 3.

10Id.
3, 5, 8, 10, 11.
11 id. 11.
12 See,

e.g, Copenhagen Accord, supranote 3.
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I. IP-RELATED SOLUTIONS

As I have suggested in previous publications, patent laws should not only be
green(ed) (i.e. polluting inventions should be unpatentable-negative system), they
should also treat those green inventions, which go above the threshold of ecofriendliness (whatever the legislature decides it is) more favorably (positive
14
system).13 Thus, a mixed system is the best solution to promote green innovation.
This flows from article 6 of the EC Treaty ("ECT") (now art. 11 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU ("TFEU")), which mandates the integration of environmental
policy within certain other EU policies. 15 This is now even clearer that the EU has
no choice in this respect. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is now in
force since December 1, 2009, clearly protects intellectual property (art. 17(2))16 but
also, and even more forcefully than article 11 TFEU, states that "[a] high level of
environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment
must be integratedinto the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the
17

principle of sustainable development."
Several incentives can be envisaged to reward greener technology:

accelerated

examination, reduction, cancellation or waiver of fees, removal of green inventions
from deferred examination, earlier publication and/or priority at the opposition and
infringement stages, stronger protection (e.g. lengthen the term of protection).
Recently, some commentators have proposed another type of incentive, namely
disclosure of information about the invention's environmental impact. 18 This would
introduce an enhanced condition of disclosure, the latter already existing in patent
laws to enable the skilled reader to make the invention. 19 An application lacking the
13 See, e.g., Estelle Derclaye, Should Patent Law Help Cool the Planet? An Inquiry from the
Point of View of EnvironmentalLaw: Part 1, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. [E.I.P.R.] 168, 183-84
(2009); Estelle Derclaye, Should Patent Law Help Cool the Planet? An Inquiry from the Point of
View of Environmental Law.* Part 2, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. [E.I.P.R.] 227, 227, 230 (2009)
[hereinafter Part A. These articles were republished on request by the editor of the International
EnergyLaw Review("IELR") 2009, issues 5 and 6, pp. 185-200, 229-237.
14
Id. at 231-32.
15 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 11, May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 1 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF; Consolidated
Version
of
the
Treaty
Establishing
the
European
Community,
art.
6,
2002
O.J.
(C
115)
[hereinafter
ECT], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en
00010331.pdf.
16 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 17(2), 2000 O.J. (C 364)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text en.pdf.
17 Compare id. art. 37 (emphasis added) ("A high level of environmental protection and the
improvement of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and
ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable development."), with TFEU, supra note 15
art. 11 ("Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and
implementation of the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting
sustainable development.").
18See generally Carolyn Abbot & David Booton, Using Patent Law's Teaching Function to
Introduce an Environmental Ethic into the Process of Technological Innovation, 21 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 219 (2009) (arguing that an environmental disclosure requirement to both European
and U.S. patent applications would make a significant contribution to the sustainable consumption
and production agenda).
1) See, e.g, 35 U.S.C. § 112
1 (2006).
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environmental part of the disclosure would not be prone to refusal, opposition or
revocation. Patent offices would not check whether the condition is satisfied. The
absence of compliance would only bite at the infringement stage. It would provide a
20
complete defence in infringement proceedings.
Undoubtedly, the proposal to green patent laws is not accepted unanimously
among patent lawyers. The doubts and concerns of the sceptics can be addressed
here again and in more detail. Even if adding a condition of eco-friendliness will be
more costly for inventors as they will have to prove an additional requirement in
order to obtain a patent, this is part of the cost of our survival. Anyway, if they have
to comply with environmental law at some point or if they wish to benefit from the
use of certain eco-labels, they will have to calculate the carbon footprints of their
products. So the cost in many cases will not be additional to what is already in place.
The rewards flowing from the system (longer term of protection, faster examination,
reduced or cancelled fees, etc.) can also potentially offset this cost. 21 It is also not
insurmountable to determine what a green invention is. The legislature just has to
decide a standard, like in environmental law, and make it applicable to patents. For
products, it will be relatively simple, even if patents do not always equal products
(e.g. complex products), part of the product will have to do something to reduce
emissions above the threshold in order to get the favoured treatment. For processes,
it is arguably more difficult. Some processes will more or less easily be falling into
the definition but others may be 'neutral' in the sense that they can be used either in
a polluting or an eco-friendly way, depending on the products used in the process.
And this may not be down to the inventor. If a process is neutral, as long as it is not
polluting as such, then it will be patentable but it will not get the favoured
treatment. Another at first sight strong objection to greening patent laws is that if
polluting inventions are made unpatentable, everyone can pollute and the technology
is available at a cheaper price than if it was patented. 22 Several counter-arguments
can be advanced. First, the statement is not as convincing as it first appears: if the
invention is unpatentable, it is much less likely that engineers will embark into
inventing it as they will have no incentive to do so in the first place. 23 Who would
spend time and money into inventing something which is unpatentable (unless it can
neatly be kept secret of course, which might by the way not always be possible)?24
Second, a patent acts as a sanction from the state. 25 The state agrees that the
invention should be rewarded by a patent. 26 The state cannot disclaim responsibility

20 Abbot
21 But

& Booton, supra note 18, at 248-49.
see discussion infra Parts 11, II.

22 EDWARD ARMITAGE & IVOR DAVIS, PATENTS AND MORALITY IN PERSPECTIVE

58 (London:

Common Law Institute of Intellectual Property 1994).
23 ARMITAGE & DAVIS, supra note 22, at 58; Derclaye, Part, supra note 13, at 229.
24 See DAVID ANDREWS
BOOKS:

&

RICHARD WILES,

INDUSTRY'S SECRET CHEMICALS

ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING

2 (2009),

available at

GROUP, OFF THE

http://www.ewg.org/files/secret-

chemicals.pdf (describing that between the years of 1990-2005 the number of confidential chemicals
has more than quadrupled from 261 to 1,105).
25 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (granting the patent holder the
right to sue an infringer).
26 Soe, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 112, 271 (defining the criteria necessary to receive a U.S.
patent, and allowing the patent holder to sue an infringer).
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for granting patents on polluting inventions. 27 This is so even if the patent office is
not (mainly) funded by public sources, as obtaining a patent is still a sanction from
the state. 28 In addition, it would be totally paradoxical and contradictory that whilst
the state grants a patent on a polluting invention via its patent law, it then prevents
its use later on via its environmental laws. It seems however that the idea is
gradually making converts as the following paragraph shows.
So far, in the EU, the United Kingdom ("UK") Intellectual Property Office
("IPO") has introduced a fast track system for green technology. 29 On May 12, 2009,
patent applications for green technologies (even those filed before May 12) can
benefit from an accelerated procedure.30 To enter the so-called "Green Channel," the
applicant must simply make a request in writing, "mak[ing] a reasonable assertion
that the invention in the patent application is one which has some environmental
benefit," 31 and "which actions [he/she] wish[es] to accelerate: Search, Combined
Search and Examination, Publication, and/or Examination."3 2 The Intellectual
33
Property Office "will require no further reasons for accelerated processing."
According to the UK IPO,
[T]here is no specific environmental standard to meet in order to benefit
from the Green Channel. The applicant simply needs to provide as much
justification as is necessary to explain why their invention is
environmentally-friendly. If, for example, the application relates to a wind
turbine or a recycling process then a simple statement that the invention is
environmentally-friendly is likely to be sufficient.
However, if the
application relates to a manufacturing process which uses less energy, then
a more detailed explanation of the environmental benefit should be
34
provided.
This system does not seem very effective as it is not always possible to find out ex
ante whether the invention will be able to benefit from the scheme as a precise
criterion of eco-friendliness is not laid out in the procedure and it is basically left to
the whim of the patent examiner.3 5 In addition, even a minor benefit will do, as the
27 WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:

PATENTS, COPYRIGHT,

TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 882 (6th ed. 2007).
28 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

PERFORMANCE

AND

ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009 68 (2009), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/
stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.pdf (stating that the USPTO has been supported by user fees,
small gifts, and gifts-in-kind since the 1993 fiscal year).
29 Press Release, U.K. Intellectual Prop. Office, UK 'Green' Inventions to Get Fast-Tracked
Through Patent System (May 12, 2009) (on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual
Property Law), availableat www.ipo.gov.uk/press-release-20090512.
30Practice Notice, U.K. Intellectual Prop. Office, Green Channel for Patent Applications (May
12, 2009) (on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law), available at
www.ipo.gov.uk/pro-types/pro-patent/p -law/p-pn/p-pn-green.htm.
'1Press Release, supra note 29.
32 Practice Notice, supra note 30.
33 Id.
34 E-mail from Sarah Barker, Patents Legal Section, Intell. Prop. Office (Dec. 22, 2009, 16:51
GMT) (on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law).
35 U.K. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, GETTING YOUR PATENT GRANTED MORE QUICKLY
14
(2009), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-fastgrantguide.pdf [hereinafter FAST GRANT GUIDE].
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rule says "some" environmental benefit.36 This may defeat the purpose and lead to a
patent race which will treat more deserving and less deserving green inventions in
the same way. Nevertheless, the UK IPO reports that patent attorneys and
37
applicants as well as other patent offices have welcomed the scheme very warmly.
As shall be seen later, the USPTO has introduced a similar albeit more detailed
system in December of 2009.38 The Australian and South Korean patent offices have
also launched similar schemes.3 9 The UK IPO reports that China, Japan and Brazil
have expressed interest in introducing similar fast track systems. 40 It also considers
that its new initiative is a success noting that between May 12 (when the system was
introduced) and December 22, 2009, seventy-seven applications have been
accelerated under the Green Channel. 41 This equates to approximately 1% of the
42
total number of applications searched and examined by the IPO over that period.
Of the applications accelerated under the Green Channel, five have already been
granted. 43 This means that it took even less time to obtain a patent on a green
technology than the nine months that D. Lammy initially announced it would take
44
for the UK IPO to grant green patents.
What other possibilities are there to foster eco-friendly inventions?
One commentator doubts of the effectiveness of the above-mentioned
46
mechanisms. 45 For him, what we need to implement is a patent rewards system.

36 Compare Press Release, supra note 29 (stating that the invention must have "some
environmental benefit"), with 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c)(2) (2009) (stating the invention must "materially"
enhance environmental quality or energy resources), and U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 708.02(V) (8th ed., 7th rev.
2008) [hereinafter MPEP].
The materiality standard does not permit an applicant to speculate as to how a
hypothetical end-user might specially apply the invention in a manner that could
materially enhance the quality of the environment. Nor does such standard
permit an applicant to enjoy the benefit of advanced examination merely because
some minor aspect of the claimed invention may enhance the quality of the
environment.

MPEP, supra.
37Barker, supra note 34.
38 Pilot Program for Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction, 74 Fed. Reg.
64,666, 64,666-69 (Dec. 8, 2009) (describing the USPTO's pilot program to expedite the prosecution
of environmentally friendly patents).
39Media Release, Austl. Intellectual Prop. Office, Fast Tracking Patents for Green Technology
Solutions (Sept. 15, 2009) (on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law),
available at http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/news/MR150909fast-track-green-patents.pdf;
Press Release, Korean Intellectual Prop. Office, Thanks to Superspeed Examination, Green
Technology Acquires Patent in a Month (Oct. 20, 2009) (on file with The John Marshall Review of
Intellectual Property Law).
40Barker, supra note 34.
41Id.
42 Id.
43Id.

44Press Release, supranote 29.
45Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intelleetual Property
Innovation: A New Basis for PatentRewards, 24 TEMP. J. Sm. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 51, 52 (2005).
46 Id.
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Under such a system, the state would acquire rights to inventions that meet the
current validity requirements and are eco-friendly and
in exchange, financially compensate[] the inventor directly instead of
granting them a patent. The invention [would] then [be] made available for
use to the general public, either freely or for a fee. Under most patent
rewards proposals, compensation is based on the inventor's expected profit,
but for the purposes of environmental innovation, compensation could be
based on the expected environmental benefit provided to society by the
47
invention.
There could, however, be problems with such a scheme. First of all, it may not
always be possible to predict the patentee's expected profit or the expected
environmental benefit the invention provides to society. But most importantly, what
if the state cannot buy all the patents which meet the conditions because there is a
flood of green patenting? Finally, inventors may not like this system and the system
would then be counter-productive as it would reduce their incentive to invent. So a
choice could be granted to inventors, either use the fast track fee-free system or the
patent rewards system. 48 Indeed, some might prefer the quick and early cash (e.g.
individuals, universities, research centres) whilst others might prefer to retain more
control over their invention (private companies).
I do not believe that a flurry of new types of compulsory licences is the solution
to the problem. Compulsory licences on green patents would decrease the incentive
to invent in the first place. The legal framework existing in most countries is good
enough as it provides compulsory licences when the patentee fails to work the
invention without legitimate reason (and therefore arguably abuses his right) and in
case a later invention improves on the initial one, and at certain detailed
conditions. 49 However, where this is valid for many countries, it is not for the United
States and some other states as the relevant articles (art. 31(b) and (1)) of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs") are
50
not mandatory.
Other patent-related projects have already been initiated such as the Eco-Patent
Commons. 51 Under the scheme, eleven companies have offered a number of patents
47Id.at 64 (footnotes omitted).
48

Id.at 65-66.
e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31, Apr.

49 See,

15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter
"TRIPs"], available at http://www.wto.int/english/docs e/legal e/27TRIPS.pdf; Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5, § A(2)-(4), Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S.
305 (revised at Stockholm Revision Conference July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention],
available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf /trtdocs-woO2O.pdf. For a
more detailed discussion and improvements to the current system of compulsory licences, see Estelle
Derclaye, Intellectual PropertyRights and Global Warming 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 263,
280-83, 287-89 (2008).
o0 TRIPs, supra note 49, art. 31.
51World Business Council for Sustainable Development, http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/
TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?MenuD=1 (follow "Eco-Patent Commons" hyperlink then follow "EcoPatents Database" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
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which provide environmental benefits for anyone to use free of charge. 52 The only
limit is defensive termination. 53 If a non-pledger asserts a patent against a pledger,
the latter can terminate its non-assert (i.e. agreement not to sue). 54 Since the launch
of the Eco-Patent Commons in January 2008, one hundred eco-friendly patents have
been pledged. 55 In early 2010, another project, the Green Xchange, will start in
56
partnership with Creative Commons.
Companies that contribute patents to the Green Xchange will have the
option of charging users a fixed annual licensing fee and can also restrict
any licensing by rivals or for competitive use. In addition, even if no annual
fee is charged, patent users must register so there is a record of who is
57
using what technology.
These patent pools and other voluntary models, including public pledges-in which
patentees assert they will not enforce their patent rights or charge a very small feeare great alternative solutions to substantive changes (i.e. to the law) as they can
transfer technology in a quicker and more flexible way (because it is easier to do than
change the law).58 The only trouble is that they remain voluntary and thus many
59
important technologies may not be available under one of these schemes.
Another important aspect which fosters technology transfer is the fact that
inventions made by publicly funded bodies such as government departments,
universities and research centres, should normally be free for all (or at least for those
60
residing in the state in question) if they can be classed as public sector information.
If they cannot be so classed, the body in question can (should even, as all residents
have sponsored its work through their taxes) always choose to give its inventions
away free of charge anyway.61 Obtaining a patent may still be useful as the
52 Memorandum from the World Bus. Council for Sustainable Dev., Dow and Fuji Xerox Join
Eco-Patents Commons, Xerox Pledges Additional Patent to Help the Planet (Oct. 20, 2009), http:/
www.wbcsd.org/Plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?DocTypeld=33&ObjectId=MzYxMTQ
(listing Bosch,
Dow, DuPont, Fuji-Xerox, IBM, Nokia, Pitney Bowes, Ricoh, Sony, Taisei, and Xerox as contributing
companies).

53ECO-PATENT COMMONS, Eco-PATENT COMMONS: A LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY FOR GLOBAL

BUSINESS TO PROTECT THE PLANET 7 (2008), available at http://www.wbcsd.org/DocRoot/
RToiFpijTJHO8Hef4N9x/Eco-PatentCommonsBrochureMarch 2009.pdf.
54 Id
55 World Business Council for Sustainable Development, supra note 51 (search returns 100
patents).
56 Green Xchange, http://greenxchange.force.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2010); see also Science
Commons, http://sciencecommons.org/projects/patent-licenses (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) (indicating
Creative Commons' partnership with Green Xchange).
57 Mary Tripsas, Everybod in the Pool of Green Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at BU5.
58 R6mi Lallement, Le R61e des Droits de Propri6t6Intellectuelle Dans les Enjeux Post-Kyoto,

in POLITIQUE CLIMATIQUE: UNE NOUVELLE ARCHITECTURE INTERNATIONALE 316 (Conseil D'analyse

Economique, No. 87, Oct. 2009), ava-able athttp://www.cae.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/087.pdf.
59See World Business Council for Sustainable Development, supra note 51.
(o See generally Council Directive 2003/98, On the Re-use of Public Sector Information, 2003
O.J. (L 345) 90 (EC) (establishing a minimum set of rules on the re-use and commercial exploitation
of documents that are held by public-sector bodies of the European Union's Member States and
generally accessible).
(31See JOHN H. BARTON & GEORGE E. OSBORNE, INTL CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES IN DEVELOPING
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technology is then disclosed efficiently as required by the patent laws. 62 But the
publication of scientific papers containing a disclosure of the inventions could still do
the trick, thereby avoiding the costly and long patenting process. 63 Surely this would
be welcome savings at a time when most nations badly need to make some. Another
related possibility is for states to "exchange" their patents. Let's imagine the
American government has a patent on wind technology and that of China has one on
solar technology, they could simply give a free licence to each other on their
respective patents, at no cost to any of the parties.
This sort of cooperation between inventors could also be done privately as well
and is highly recommended. 64 This means cooperation rather than competition and
could be a problem in terms of EU competition law. 65 However, the Technology
Transfer Block Exemption 66 allows some collaboration without breaching competition
laws and article 81(3) ECT (now 101(3) TFEU) also allows for cooperation to advance
technological progress so long as the agreement allows consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, the restrictions of the collaboration agreement are indispensable to
the attainment of these objectives and the agreement does not afford the
undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial
part of the products in question. 67 This sort of cooperation is in fact almost mandated
by the principle of environmental law embedded in many environmental treaties
(such as the Rio Declaration and the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change ("UNFCCC")) namely Common But Differentiated Responsibility
("CBDR").68 This principle means that developed countries must help developing
COUNTRIES: AN ANALYSIS OF SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC. BIOFUEL AND WIND TECHNOLOGIES xii

(2007),

available at http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/does/BARTON-DEC-2007.pdf (pleading for the
licensing of environmentally-friendly of publicly funded inventions similarly to the "humanitarian
clauses.., considered in the medical and agricultural areas"). Contra IAN HARVEY, CLIMATE
GRoUP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE CATALYST TO DELIVER Low CARBON TECHNOLOGIES

8 (2008), available at http://www.theclimategroup.org/_assets/files/Intellectual-Property-Rights.pdf
(indicating that the public sector should patent its inventions but choose what to do with its patents,
i.e. ask for a price or not).
(2 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (2006) (requiring

disclosure of an invention's written description,

instructions enabling the invention to be made and used, and the inventor's contemplated best
mode); European Patent Convention, art. 83, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (revised at the
Convention on the Grant of European Patents Nov. 29, 2000) [hereinafter EPC], available at http://
www.epo.org/patents/law/legaltexts/html/epe/1973/e/ar83.html (requiring a "sufficiently clear and
complete" disclosure of the invention).
(33See generallyEUROPEAN RESEARCH ADVISORY BOARD, SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATION: POLICY ON

OPEN ACCESS (2006), available at http://ee.europa.eu/researei/eurab/pdf/eurab-scipub-report recom
m_dec06 en.pdf (explaining the benefits to the scientific research system by making research results
freely available through open access policies).
(34See BERNICE LEE ET AL.,

CHATHAM HOUSE, WHO OWNS OUR Low CARBON FUTURE?:

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES
59 (2009), available at http://
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/IP.
(35TFEU, supranote 15, arts. 101-02.
66 Commission Regulation
772/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11, 11-12 (EC) (discussing the
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements).
(37 TFEU, supranote 15, art. 101.
(38 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, Kyoto Protocol To
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 10 [hereinafter Kyoto
Protoeo,
available at http://unfece.int/cop3/resource/does/cop3/protocol.pdf,
Conference
on
Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
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countries through technology transfer and financial assistance and both developed
69
and developing countries are expected to cooperate to meet the goals of the treaties.
The reason is that developed countries have more responsibility because historically
they caused more emissions.70 The developing countries must only take steps
commensurate with their capabilities to meet the objective of the treaties. 71 One way
to help developing countries in terms of technology transfer is not to lessen
intellectual property protection as such but to grant free or low cost licenses on
certain technologies for a set period to developing and least developed countries. For
instance, carbon capture and storage ("CCS") seems to be the quickest way to reduce
carbon emissions whilst we build sufficient and efficient wind and solar farms.
However, this technology is so recent that patents are still in force. 72 We can't wait
twenty years to act, so the developed world may have to share some of its intellectual
property with the developing world, at least for little while.

II. NON-IP

RELATED SOLUTIONS

There are also some other (strong) non-IP related medicaments for curing global
warming. The following list of measures is by no means exhaustive but includes
some of the most important ones. First, as has been noted by many, not all climatefriendly technologies are protected. 73 Some of them have seen their patents expire
74
and others have never been patented.
Development, princ. 7 [hereinafter Rio Declaration], available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.
Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentlD=78&ArticlelD= 1163.
69 Kyoto Protocol,supra note 68, arts. 10-11; Rio Declaration,supra note 68, princ. 7.
70Fourteen Days, supra note 1 ("[T]he rich world is responsible for most of the accumulated
carbon in the atmosphere - three-quarters of all carbon dioxide emitted since 1850."); Kaitlin Mara,
Bangkok Climate Meeting Leaves PoliticalIssues, Compulsory Licences Unresolved, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH, Oct. 12, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/10/12/bangkok-climate-meeting-leavespolitical-issues-unresolved-compulsory-licence-debate-rising/ ("Past UN discussions on this issue
place the onus on developed nations to take the lead, citing historical responsibility for the
problem.").

71See, e.g., Rio Declaration,supra note 68, princ. 11.
72E.g, U.S. Patent No. 7,596,952 (filed Sept. 29, 2003) (issued Oct. 6, 2009). A search in
European Patent Office database (www.ep.espacenet.com) on January 23, 2010, reveals only twelve
patents for carbon capture (incidentally none for both carbon capture and storage), most of them
dating from 2009, the first one dating from 2007. Most inventors are big energy companies such as
General Electric, Gas de France, Siemens, Alstom, as well as some universities and research centres
such as the Institut Francais du P6trole, Harvard University, Penn State University, and the
University of Goettingen.
73See, e.g., Yvo De Boer, Executive Sec'y, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Presentation at the European Patent Forum and Inventor of the Year 2008, slide 11 (May
7, 2008), http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/9DOB55A30B48010FC12574440046
F844/$File/yvo de boeren.pdf, Michelle Childs, Head of European Affairs, Presentation at the
European Patent Forum and Inventor of the Year 2008, slide 2 (May 7, 2008), http:// documents.
epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/02A8FDA1794A3877C 125744400467022/$File/michelle-childs
en.pdf.
74 Sinfah Tunsarawuth, 1P Protection No Barrier to Green Technology Transfer, Says Key
Negotiator, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Oct. 5 2009 http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2009/10/05/ip
protectionno .barrier-to-green-technology-transfer-says-key-negotiator/?utm-source=feedburner
&utm medium=fee d&utm-campaign=Feed%3A+ip-watch+(Intellectual+Property+Watch)
(quoting
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Of course, another way to reduce emissions is to help least developed and
developing countries financially in their efforts to do so.5 One way to do so is to
finance the building of renewable energy plants on their land. Another way is to
financially help to reforest their land. And there are many others. It is not as
expensive as one may imagine. According to the World Bank's Global Report of the
Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change Study, the cost for developing countries
of adapting, between 2010 and 2050, to an approximately two degrees Celsius
warmer world by 2050 is between US$75 billion to US$100 billion a year. 76 This
amount is about the same as that of the foreign aid that developed countries already
77
give developing countries annually.
Another type of measure involving IPR can be used indirectly helping any
country in its adaptation to and mitigation of climate change by forcing countries to
respect their environmental commitments. Suspension of IPR, as was used by
78
Antigua and Barbuda in the WTO dispute that opposed them to the United States,
can have an enormous impact. If it appears that a country does not cut its emissions
as much as it has committed to, 79 then the other countries could temporarily suspend
the protection the non-abiding country benefits from through its patents. This would
be especially useful for small developing nations which have the most to fear from
climate change (e.g. Bangladesh or island states). Such suspension could be based on
articles XX and/or XXI of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")
80
which allow respectively general and security exceptions to GATT/WTO rules.
These exceptions include the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources and the protection of the state's
"essential security interests ... taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations."8 1 Therefore, if it is necessary for a country to use a patented
Kunihiko Shimada, "a co-chair of a subgroup working on agreement text on the issue of development
and transfer of technology in [then] current two-week talks on climate change in Bangkok.").
75See FourteenDays, supra note 1.
76SERGIO MARGULIS ET AL., GLOBAL REPORT OF THE ECONOMICS OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE STUDY, THE COSTS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: NEW
METHODS AND ESTIMATES 1, 12 (2009) (consultation draft), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTCC/Resources/EACCReportO928Final.pdf.
77Id. at 1.
78 See Dispute Settlement Body Report, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Ganmbling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/22 (June 22, 2007), available at 2007 WL
1877628.
7) Probably a reasonable level should be set. Falling 1 or 2 percent short of the target should
probably not be enough to suspend the failing country's IPR. Of course here the mechanism would
not function as a retaliation measure within the framework of the WTO agreements, as commitment
to reduce emissions are not part of the WTO legal framework but of other multilateral agreements
outside the WTO framework.
See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849.
80General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts. XX-XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-li, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (revised atMarrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization Apr. 15,
1994), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/gatt.pdf.
81 Id. Article XX provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
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technology which is crucial to the protection of its environment in the sense that it is
necessary to adapt to climate change because the non-abiding country's emissions
will contribute to the country's environmental damage, and the patentee either
refuses to grant a licence or only proposes astronomic prices, the country could
suspend the protection afforded by patent and other related IPR, in other words
bypass the patentee's refusal and freely use the patented technology until the nonabiding country meets its emissions targets. 82 Alternatively, states could use the
security exception, as it clearly allows the state to take any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests in case of emergency in
international relations. 83 Using IP-protected technology unavailable at a reasonable
price could be such action and climate change can already be considered an
emergency in international relations. The WTO-consistency of these types of
measures is reinforced by the fact that, according to the WTO itself, sustainable
development and the protection and preservation of the environment are some of its
fundamental goals. 84
This is even enshrined in the Marrakesh Agreement
85
establishing the WTO.
Another important change which would greatly influence policy, and thus the
law, is to have a green economic index. 86 Currently economic activity and the gross
domestic product ("GDP") do not include a country's natural resources. 87 The
calculation of the GDP even counts activities which harm the environment as good
for the economy.88 For instance, jammed roads increase GDP through the increase
sales of fuel but harm the environment. 89 The Commission on the Measurement of
Economic Performance and Social Progress ("CMEPSP") recommends that we should

(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.
Id. art. XX. Article XXI provides in relevant part that "Nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed... () to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests ... (iii) taken in time of war or other
emergency in international relations .... " Id. art. XXI.
82 See id. art. XX(b),(g).
83 See id. art. XXI(b)(iii).
81 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1144, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, available athttp://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/O4wto.pdf.
85 Id; see also WORLD TRADE ORG., THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AND CLIMATE
CHANGE, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/envir e/climate change e.pdf ("In the
Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO, members established a clear link between sustainable
development and disciplined trade liberalization - in order to ensure that market opening goes hand
in hand with environmental and social objectives.").

86 See Mike Holderness, A Common Treasury for All to Live Upon: With the Flaws in
Economic Measurements Like GDPExposed for All to See, Do We Need Racica]New Ways to Assess
Eeonomic Activity?, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 24, 2009, at 30-31.
87 See id. at 31.
88 Id
at 30.
89 Id.
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not measure economic production but human well-being.90 The good news is that the
European Commission has already adopted many of the CMEPSP's proposals.91

III. THE U.S.'s CONTRIBUTION
What is the U.S.'s contribution to the problem of climate change as far as patent
law and patents are concerned? In fact, the U.S. was a pioneer in this area and had
several systems in place already in the 1970s.
First, the Clean Air Act provides for a compulsory licence on patents which help
in meeting certain air emissions standards. 92 This federal law dates from 1970 and is
now codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7608. 93 The system works as follows. A private
individual can apply to the Environmental Protection Agency and the United States
Attorney General to require that the patent in question be licensed. 94 The applicant
must comply with three conditions, namely: (1)the patented product or process must
be "used or intended for public or commercial use and not otherwise reasonably
available," (2) "there are no reasonable alternative methods" in order to comply with
the said emissions standards, and (3) failure to obtain the license would result in a
"substantial lessening of competition or tendency to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce in any section of the country." 95 If the conditions are met, the Attorney
General can ask the district court for the district in which the patent owner resides,
does business, or is found to issue an order requiring the patent owner to licence it on
reasonable terms and conditions. 96 Writing in 2005, a commentator noted that in
thirty-five years, the system apparently had never been used, adding that this
finding "supports the conclusion that environmental innovation will be licensed
relatively efficiently without the necessity of compulsory licensing." 97 A Westlaw
search up to now gives no further result. Indeed, some of the conditions set out in
the act will generally not be met, for instance because it must involve a substantial
lessening of competition. 98 Also a reasonably minded patent owner will licence its
90 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 41 (2009), availahle at http://www.ofee.seinens-

po.fr/pdf/documents/rapport.pdf Holderness, supra note 86, at 30.
91 CAMILLA ADELLE & MARC PALLEMAERTS,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS: OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT FP-FUNDED RESEARCH AND IDENTIFICATION

OF FURTHER NEEDS 46-47 (2009), available athttp://ec.europa.eu/research/sd/pdf/sdi-review.pdf.
92 42

U.S.C. § 7608 (2006); see Mandel, supra note 45, at 60 n.40 ("The air emission standards

pursuant to which a compulsory license may be sought are those established in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411,
7412, and 7521.").
93 See Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1708-09 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7608). The latest version of the act is available at http://www.epa.gov/
air/caa/.
94 42

U.S.C. § 7608; 40 C.F.R. § 95.2 (2009).

95 42 U.S.C. § 7608. "If a compulsory license were granted, the patent owner is entitled to
'adequate' compensation based on the economic value of the license. 40 C.F.R. § 95.4(a)(7). The
license is nonexclusive, non-assignable, and restricted in scope and duration as necessary to fulfill

the Clean Air Act's emission requirements. Id. § 954.4(a)(1)-(3) [sic]." Mandel, supra note 45, at 60
n.41.
9642 U.S.C. § 7608(2); 40 C.F.R. § 95.4(b).
97 Mandel, supra note 45, at 60.
98

42 U.S.C. § 7608(2).
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patent voluntarily or because of the threat posed by the provision. 99 The act has not
been challenged before the WTO panels so it can be presumed WTO-compliant. 10 0
Long before the UK, the U.S. had a fast track system. 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c) (2005)
(Code of Federal Regulations Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights) states that "[a]
petition to make an application special may be filed [on the basis] ... [tihat the
invention will materially:
() [e]nhance the quality of the environment; (ii)
[c]ontribute to the development or conservation of energy resources ..... 10
However, it seems that this provision has not been used.10 2 There is little evidence as
to why. 10 3 But one main probable cause is that "[t]he research and development
costs, and time devoted to most environmental innovation, likely substantially exceed
the delays and expense of patent prosecution. Consequently, improvements through
streamlining patent prosecution would not significantly increase incentives for
environmental innovation."10 4 Another cause could be that applicants filing
10 5
environmental inventions are simply unaware of the special regime.
Most recently, the USPTO took a further initiative in this direction. Normally,
green inventions cannot benefit from the accelerated examination program unless
they comply with its requirements.1 0 6 But since December 2009, the USPTO has
implemented a pilot program for certain inventions, namely for applications
pertaining to green technologies including greenhouse gas reduction (this includes
applications pertaining to environmental quality, more efficient utilization and
conservation of energy resources, discovery or development of renewable energy
resources or greenhouse gas emission reduction)l07
Under the new Green
Technology Pilot Program, "renewable energy resources" includes
hydroelectric, solar, wind, renewable biomass, landfill gas, ocean (including
tidal, wave, current, and thermal), geothermal, and municipal solid waste,
as well as the transmission, distribution, or other services directly used in
providing electrical energy from these sources. The second category would
include inventions relating to the reduction of energy consumption in
combustion systems, industrial equipment, and household appliances. The
third category listed above would include, but is not limited to, inventions
that contribute to (1)advances in nuclear power generation technology, or
(2) fossil fuel power generation or industrial processes with greenhouse gasabatement technology (e.g., inventions that significantly improve safety and
reliability of such technologies).108

9 See id. § 7608(1)-(2).
100 K.

RAVI

SRINIVAS,

CLIMATE

CHANGE,

TECHNOLOGY

TRANSFER

AND

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY RIGHTS 28 (Research & Info. Sys. for Developing Countries, RIS-DP # 153, 2009),
available at http://www.ris.org.in/dpl53-pap.pdf.
101 37 C.F.R. § 1.102(c)(2) (the text remains the same in the 2009 version).
102 See Mandel, supra note 45, at 62.
10:3Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 62 n.54.
106 37 C.F.R. § 1.102 (2009).
107 Pilot Program for Green

64,666 (Dec. 8, 2009).
108 Id.at 64,667.

Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction, 74 Fed. Reg.
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According to the Green Technology Pilot Program, the examination of these
applications will be accelerated even if they do not meet all of the current
requirements of the accelerated examination program. 10 9 The fee required for
petitions to make special is also waived under the program. 110 There is a standard to
meet. Only "[p]atent applications for inventions which materially enhance the
quality of the environment under the conditions specified in item V of MPEP
§ 708.02" will benefit from the new scheme. 1 Item V of the MPEP § 708.02 (petition
to make special, environmental quality) explains the meaning of "materially
enhancing the quality of the environment" under "37 CFR 1.102 Advancement of
examination."11 2 Basically, the USPTO will grant special status to all applications
which contribute "to the restoration or maintenance of one of the basic life-sustaining
natural elements," i.e., air, water, and soil.113 If it isnot clear from the disclosure
that the claimed invention contributes to the "restoration or maintenance of one of
the basic life-sustaining natural elements, the petition must be accompanied by a
statement.., explaining how the materiality standard is met."11 4 The standard
does not permit an applicant to speculate as to how a hypothetical end-user
might specially apply the invention in a manner that could materially
enhance the quality of the environment. Nor does such standard permit an
applicant to enjoy the benefit of advanced examination merely because
some minor aspect of the claimed invention may enhance the quality of the
15
environment
including (1)the development of renewable energy or energy conservation, or
116
(2) greenhouse gas emission reduction.
The U.S. is thus already quite advanced in the greening of its patent law.
However, it can and should do even more. It should also introduce a ban on
inventions which prejudice the environment at least equivalent but, if possible, even
better than article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention ("EPC").117 The U.S. is
one of only a small minority of states which does not include a provision excluding
from patentability inventions which may harm the environment (i.e. exclude them
even if it is not yet scientifically certain that they do but there is already some
109 Id. at 64,666.
0
11
Id. at 64,666-67.
M Id.at 64,667 (emphasis added).
112 MPEP, supra note 36, § 708.02; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.102 (c)(2)(i) (2009) (requiring an
invention to materially enhance the quality of the environment).
113MPEP, supra note 36, § 708.02.
114

Id,

H5 Id.
116 Pilot Program for Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction, 234 Fed. Reg.
at 64,668.
11 EPC, supra note 62, art. 53(a). Article 53(a) of the EPC provides that "European patents
shall not be granted in respect of. (a) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be
contrary to 'ordre pubhli or morality" provided that the exploitation "shall not be deemed to be so
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting
States." Id.
Such provision should hopefully also catch inventions which prevent recycling, as it
could now be said to be against morality or ordcre pubht. Id. For more legal certainty, a provision
should be specifically included in the statutory law to this effect.
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scientific evidence to this effect).118 Otherwise, it will still be possible to obtain
patents for inventions harming the environment and in fact the USPTO will be
obliged by law to grant patents for polluting inventions.

CONCLUSION

All over the world, some - important - patent offices have started to green their
patent laws by introducing fast track systems. 119 This can only be applauded.
However, it is doubtful whether the initiatives will be sufficient or even at all used.
Some studies have shown that many applicants play with time purposively extending
the period of uncertainty (scope of invention, breadth of claims, etc.). Whilst this
seems to be the case more in critical fields, such as ICT standardization, it is not
impossible that applicants (will) play such games in the field of environmental
innovation as well. It is too early to find out as both the UK and U.S. initiatives only
date from 2009. Only time will tell. Extending the term of patent protection might
not actually work as an incentive to invent green. According to Mandel, the majority
of environmentally-friendly inventions are outdated before the expiration of the
patent term. 120 Thus, lengthening the term of protection would not significantly
increase incentives to invent. Reduction or waiver of patent offices' fees, like faster
examination, may not be enough to increase the incentive of ecological inventors. As
noted above, the R&D costs and time devoted to environmental inventions are likely
1 21
to exceed the delays and expense of patent prosecution.
These findings are no auspicious omen. Whilst we already have a good number
of green technologies available in the public domain, most remain quite expensive
and thus cannot yet beat the price of oil and gas. 122 We therefore need more costeffective ways to produce energy and these will require inventions, which if
patentable will be subject to the patentees' power for twenty years. 123 Unless there is
competition in the market the price of these technologies will thus remain high. Also
the quickest fix to the increase of GHG seems to be CCS, which will remain patented

118

Compare 35

U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (providing the definition of patentable subject matter in the

U.S.), with EPC, supra note 62, art. 53(a) (requiring that an invention not be "contrary to orcire
public or morality"), and Andean Community Decision 486: Common Intellectual Property Regime
art. 20(b), Dec. 1, 2000, availableat http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/Junac/Decisiones/DEC486ae.asp#
tit2 (allowing no patents that exploit "human or animal life or health," and also to "avoid serious
prejudice to plant life and the environment"). For more details see Shawn Kolitch, The
Environmentaland Public Health Impacts of US. PatentLaw: Making the case for Incorporatinga
PrecautionaryPrinciple,36 ENVTL. L. 221, 248-55 (2006).
119 Pilot Program for Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction, 74 Fed. Reg.
64,666 (Dec. 8, 2009); Press Release, supra note 29.
120 Mandel, supra note 45, at 61.
121 Id.

at 62.

122 See Clifford Krauss, Alternative Energy Suddenly Faces Headwinds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,

2008, at B1 (indicating that the falling price of oil lowers the incentive to explore expensive
renewable energy).
123 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (stating that U.S. patents expire twenty years from the initial
filing date); EPC, supra note 62, art. 63 ("The term of the European patent shall be 20 years from
the date of filing of the application.").
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for around twenty years from now. 124 The problem is that we cannot wait twenty
years to solve global warming. This means that patents are just one part of the
equation. Therefore, all the solutions noted above need to be combined to achieve the
most efficient way of reducing our GHG emissions. More than patents, what will be
needed is collaboration, funding, goodwill and above all individual and collective
commitment. We will also have to change our consumption habits, at least for a
while, whilst we move to renewable energy. So at least to the relief of most people in
the West, "good old capitalism," albeit not the wild and excessive version of it which
may include "consumerism," can survive as long as it is green(ed). For the moment,
we still have Mother Nature working for us. Let us grab this short instant that is
left to us now and use Nature's free, resourceful and beautiful assets in the most
effective and respectful way before it's too late. Otherwise, we will paradoxically be
125
the most advanced and "intelligent" but also stupidest species on earth.

124

5 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,596,952 (filed Sept. 29, 2003) (issued Oct. 6,

2009).
125 See The Age of Stupid, http://www.ageofstupid.net (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). After all the
stages through which man has evolved from the Stone Age to the Industrial Age, if we don't do
anything now, we might enter the last one, the age of stupid.

